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【预告】EpistemicWildCard
发布时间: 2017-10-12

报告人:刘洋

时间:2017101815:00—1700

地点:北京师范大学主楼A805

 

Abstract:

There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence, or “subjective probability,” about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? Such probabilities are usually referred to as “action credences” in the literature. In this talk, I will first give an overview of Bayesian subjectivist decision theory we owe to writers like Frank Ramsey and L. J. Savage. I will then provide a defense of the thesis that, while deliberating about what to do, one cannot rationally have credences for what she is about to do. I will argue that action credences cannot hold in classical Bayesian decision theory. 

 

 

 

方:北京范大学逻辑知研究所

 


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