主讲人：Dag Westerståhl

         瑞典斯德哥尔摩大学哲学系教授

         瑞典皇家科学院院士

时间：2018年4月11日16:00-18:00

地点：北京师范大学主楼A809

摘要: 

Carnap’s 1943 book The Formalization of Logic raised the issue of whether the consequence relation in a logic has the property of fixing the meaning of the logical constants in the language. He thought this property was just as important as soundness and completeness,but this aspect of the fit between syntax and semantics has been rather neglected since. Carnap focused on classical propositional logic, but question can be asked for any logic. For example, does classical first-order consequence determine the meaning ofthe symbols for disjunction, negation, and the universal quantifier? We show that once the question is made precise, there are precise answers in the case of first-order logic. How about, for example, intuitionistic logic, or modal logic? I will present thecase of first-order logic, and then discuss Carnap’s question for modal logic, which is interestingly different in several ways. This is joint work with Denis Bonnay.

北京师范大学哲学学院逻辑与认知研究所