主讲人：唐热风
中国社会科学院哲学所研究员

主持人：李红
北京师范大学哲学学院教授

The paper proposes and defends the view called modified naive realism, according to which we perceive physical objects directly and these physical objects exist and retain all types of properties we perceive them as possessing when unperceived, although the way we perceive physical objects is modified by various perceptual conditions. Modified naive realism maintains the basic idea of naive realism and rejects the argument from illusion by seeing that that the way we perceive physical object is modified by various perceptual conditions is no threat to the idea that we perceive these physical object directly. The point is to see that the root mistake of the argument from illusion is the assumption that in illusory experience we perceive directly an appearance rather than the physical object. This can be demonstrated by examining various kinds of illusion enumerated by the sense datum theorist. And the case of hallucination can be considered a special case of perceptual experience if only we see that space is the general object of sensory experience. There is then no need to assume the existence of mental object. We can thus conclude that naive realism is immune to the argument from illusion.

主办单位：北京师范大学外国哲学与文化研究所、分析哲学国际研究中心