Useful Information

Registration

There will be two registration desks for participants traveling from outside Beijing: one in the lobby of Holiday Inn Beijing Deshengmen（北京德胜门华宇假日酒店）, the other one in the lobby of Jingshi Hotel（京师大厦）. Registration will be open from 14:00-18:45, on Nov. 1 (Friday). Participants can choose to register at either of the two locations. Conference materials will be distributed at the registration.

Other participants can choose to register in the morning of Nov. 2 (Saturday), from 7:30 to 8:20, in the entrance hall of Jingshi Academy（京师学堂）, before the conference opening.

Conference Venue

The conference will be held in the Jingshi Academy（京师学堂）, located in the Haidian Campus of Beijing Normal University（北京师范大学海淀校区）. The address is No. 19, XinJieKouWai St., HaiDian District, Beijing（新街口外大街19号）. See the map on the last page for the exact location of the Jingshi Hall.

Travel Information

The nearest subway stations to the campus are Beitaipingzhuang Station（北太平庄站）and Jishuitan Station（积水潭站）. Apart from subway, taking taxis from any of the train stations of Beijing to BNU are also an expedient option.

Taking a taxi from the Beijing Capital International Airport（北京首都国际机场）to BNU will cost approximately 100 yuan. Taking a taxi from the Beijing Daxing International Airport（北京大兴国际机场）to BNU will cost approximately 150-200 yuan. Taxi fare is higher during nighttime. Due to Daxing Airport’s greater distance from BNU, taking the Daxing Airport Subway Line is a more convenient and economical option.

Campus Access

Visitors not affiliated with BNU will have to apply for campus access permissions before entering the campus. To this end, please make sure to:

(1) send us your ID/passport number and your phone number so that we can apply for your access permission beforehand (you will receive an SMS when the application is successful), and

(2) scan your Chinese ID card or show the SMS to the gate guard when you enter the BNU campus.

Accommodations

We have booked hotels for some of our participants. Some will be staying at Holiday Inn Beijing Deshengmen（北京德胜门华宇假日酒店）, while some will be staying at Jingshi Hotel（京师大厦）. If you are uncertain which hotel you are going to staying at, please contact us.

Please also notice that Jingshi Hotel resides within the BNU campus, and the latest check-in time for Jingshi Hotel is 11pm every day. If you will be staying at Jingshi Hotel but will arrive later than 11pm, please make sure to contact us beforehand.

Addresses of the two hotels are as follows:

(A) Holiday Inn Beijing Deshengmen: No. 71 De-Sheng-Men-Wai Street, Xicheng District, Beijing, China（北京西城区德胜门外大街71号北京德胜门华宇假日酒店）

(B) Jingshi Hotel: No. 19, XinJieKouWai St., HaiDian District, Beijing（北京海淀区新街口外大街19号京师大厦）

规范性哲学会议安排表

Overview of Conference Schedule

日期Date	时间Time	内容Content		地点Venue
11月1日 Nov 1	14:00-18:00	参会嘉宾报到 Registration
11月2日 Nov 2	上午 Morning	8:30-9:00	开幕式 Opening Ceremony	京师学堂 京师厅 Jingshi Academy, Jingshi Hall
		9:00-9:45	主旨报告1 Keynote 1
		9:45-10:30	主旨报告2 Keynote 2
		10:30-10:40	茶歇 Coffee Break
		10:40-11:25	主旨报告3 Keynote 3
		11:25-12:10	主旨报告4 Keynote 4
	下午 Afternoon	13:40-15:45	专题报告 Symposium	京师学堂 第二报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2
				京师学堂 第五报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5
		15:45-16:00	茶歇 Coffee Break
		16:00-18:00	专题报告 Symposium	京师学堂 第二报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2
				京师学堂 第五报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5
11月3日 Nov 3	上午 Morning	8:30-10:35	专题报告 Symposium	京师学堂 第二报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2
				京师学堂第五报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5
		10:35-10:50	茶歇 Coffee Break
		10:50-12:30	专题报告 Symposium	京师学堂 第二报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2
				京师学堂 第五报告厅 Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5
	下午 Afternoon	14:00-14:45	主旨报告5 Keynote 5	京师学堂 京师厅 Jingshi Academy, Jingshi Hall
		14:45-15:30	主旨报告6 Keynote 6
		15:30-15:40	茶歇 Coffee Break
		15:40-16:25	主旨报告7 Keynote 7
		16:25-17:10	主旨报告8 Keynote 8
		17:10-17:55	主旨报告9 Keynote 9
		17:55-18:00	闭幕式 Closing Ceremony

Conference Program

Day 0 (Nov 1st, 2024)
14:00 – 18:00	Registration Location 1: Holiday Inn Hotel Lobby Location 2: Jingshi Hotel Lobby
18:00	Dinner (Lan Hui Restaurant)

Day 1 (Nov 2nd, 2024)
	Venue A (Jingshi Academy, Jingshi Hall)
	Opening Ceremony Chair: Refeng Tang唐热风 (Beijing Normal University)
8:30-9:00	Opening Address Xiangdong Wu吴向东 (Beijing Normal University) The “Philosophy of Normativity” Research Project at BNU Hong Li李红 (Beijing Normal University) Group Photo
	Conference Keynote 1 & 2 Chair: Yujian Zheng郑宇健 (Shenzhen University)
9:00-9:45	Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh) Normativity and Freedom
9:45-10:30	Yi Jiang江怡 (Shanxi University) Charles S. Peirce and the Normative Sciences
	Coffee Break
	Conference Keynote 3 & 4 Chair: Michael Beaney毕明安 (Tsinghua University)
10:40-11:25	Hannah Ginsborg (University of California, Berkeley) Normativity without Reasons
11:25-12:10	Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California) Beyond Normativity: Can Metaethics Escape Samsara’s Wheel?
	Lunch Break (Lan Hui Restaurant)
	Venue B (Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2)		Venue C (Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5)
	Chair: Pak Kiu Chow周柏乔 (UOW College HK)		Chair: Jianhua Mei梅剑华 (Shanxi University)
13:40-14:05	Yujian Zheng 郑宇健 (Shenzhen University)	Memes, Mind and Normativity	Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu祖旭华 (Taiwan Chung Cheng University)	Rationality, Embeddedness, and Imaginary Cases in Ethics
14:05-14:30	Ryan Simonelli (Wuhan University)	Semantic Norms and Their Worldly Correspondents	Jun-Hyeok Kwak郭峻赫 Xiaoya Hua 花晓雅 (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)	Democratic Civility with Relational Non-domination: A Critique of Martha Nussbaum’s “Constructive Shame”
14:30-14:55	Haiqiang Dai 代海强 (Beijing Normal University)	Primitive Normativity and Rule-Following	Jérôme Pelletier (Institut Nicod)	The Normativity of Fictionality Judgements
14:55-15:20	Xing Nan 南星 (Peking University)	Kant and the Problem of Normativity	Junhao Lu 卢俊豪 (Sun Yat-sen University)	The Normative Force of Morality and Virtue Reasons
15:20-15:45	Binbin Wang 王彬彬 (Beijing Wuzi University)	McDowell on the Normativity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy and German Idealism	Shiwen Zhong 钟世文 (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)	Constructivism without Procedures: A Dilemma for Humean Metaethical Constructivism
	Coffee Break
	Chair: Haojun Zhang张浩军 (Renmin University of China)		Chair: Sebastian Sunday Grève (Peking University)
16:00-16:25	Pak Kiu Chow 周柏乔 (UOW College HK)	Contingent, Necessary, and Sortal Identity	Sumei Cheng 成素梅 (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)	The Normativity and Variability of Rules
16:25-16:50	James Collin (VinUniversity)	Return of the MEC	Jie Gao 高洁 (Zhejiang University)	Inquiry and Practical Rationality
16:50-17:15	Xinkan Zhao 赵新侃 (Peking University)	The Normativity Objection and the Coloring Strategy	Ziming Song 宋子明 (Sichuan University)	The Problem of a Normative Interpretation of Classical Decision Theory and Responses
17:15-17:40	Lixiao Lin 林立霄 (Tsinghua University)	Aesthetic Assertions and the Understanding Norm	Davide Fassio (Zhejiang University)	The Best Argument Against Objectivism is a Better Argument for Objectivism
17:40-18:00	Hongyu Zhou 周红宇 (Heilongjiang University)	The Diachronic Explanation of Semantic Normativity and Its Problems	Yiwen Zhan 展翼文 (Beijing Normal University)	Are There Epistemic Norms for Bounded Agents?
	Dinner (Lan Hui Restaurant)

Day 2 (Nov 3rd, 2024)
	Venue B (Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 2)		Venue C (Jingshi Academy, Meeting Room 5)
	Chair: Sumei Cheng成素梅 (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)		Chair: Ivan Ivanov (Capital Normal University)
8:30-8:55	Xueguang Zhang张学广 (Northwest University)	Marx and Wittgenstein on Practical Normativity	Huaping Wang 王华平 (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)	A Representative Theory of Fittingness
8:55-9:20	Ina Goy (Beijing Normal University)	Is Kant a Proponent of Divine Design?	Long Tse (University of Bonn) Nastasia Mueller (University of Duesseldorf)	The Objectivity and Normativity of Fundamental and Higher-Order Emotions
9:20-9:45	Ke Liu刘科 (University of Shanghai for Science and Technology)	The Meanings and Reflections of the Contemporary "Codifiable Critique" of Virtue Ethics	Brandon Yip (Singapore Management University)	Morality and the Value of Fitting Emotion
9:45-10:10	Shuai Wang 王帅 (Shenzhen University)	Facts and Principles: Justification in Rawls and Cohen’s Theories of Justice and the Third Man Argument	Zhengmi Zhouhuang 周黄正蜜 (Beijing Normal University)	Emotion and the Lawfulness without Law
10:10-10:35	Zhuoqun Li 李卓群 (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)	Can Sophisticated Consequentialism Save Epistemic Consequentialism?	Zhichen Tan 谈知辰 (Peking University)	Modal Security Does Not Imply the Failure of Evolutionary Debunking
	Coffee Break
	Chair: Yiwen Zhan展翼文 (Beijing Normal University)		Chair: Tingting Niu牛婷婷 (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)
10:50-11:15	Hao Hu 胡浩 (Shenzhen University)	The Naturalizations of Teleology and Normative Meaning within the Bayesian Framework	Zhu Xu 徐竹 (East China Normal University)	Non-Evidential Reasons in Hinge Epistemology
11:15-11:40	Haibin Tian 田海滨 (Xiamen University)	Ignorance, Knowledge, and the Norm of Inquiry	Kevin Lynch (Huaqiao University)	The Formal and the Material Mode
11:40-12:05	Fabio Ceravolo	Reasonable Tool-Making: Latitude in the ‘Toolbox’ View of Metaphysics	Hongtao Zhang 张洪涛 (Shandong University of Arts)	On the Normative Nature of Wilfrid Sellars’ Scientific Realism
12:05-12:30	Jiamin Xu许嘉敏 Jie Fan范杰 (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)	What is Ignorance? A New Normative View	I-Sen Chen 陈以森 (Sichuan University)	Machine Learning and A Priori Knowledge
	Lunch Break (Lan Hui Restaurant)
	Venue A (Jingshi Academy, Jingshi Hall)
	Conference Keynote 5 & 6 Chair: Hao Tang唐浩 (Tsinghua University)
14:00-14:45	John Hyman (University College London) Frailty and Excuses
14:45-15:30	Refeng Tang唐热风 (Beijing Normal University) Against the Means-End Conception of Practical Reasoning
	Coffee Break
	Conference Keynote 7 – 9 Chair: Haiqiang Dai代海强 (Beijing Normal University)
15:40-16:25	Herman Cappelen (The University of Hong Kong) Conceptual Engineering of Normative Language: Amelioration or Abandonment?
16:25-17:10	Zhifang Zhu朱志方 (Wuhan University) Empirical Justification of Normative Statements
17:10-17:55	Adrian Moore (University of Oxford) Where are You in the Conduct of Your Life as a Rational Agent?
17:55-18:00	Closing Remarks Hong Li李红 (Beijing Norma University)
	Dinner

会 议 议 程

2024年11月1日
14:00 – 18:00	会议报到 地点一：假日酒店大堂 地点二：京师大厦大堂
18:00	晚餐（兰蕙餐厅）

2024年11月2日
	分会场A（京师学堂京师厅）
	开幕式 主持人：唐热风 （北京师范大学）
8:30-9:00	欢迎致辞 吴向东 （北京师范大学） 北京师范大学“规范性哲学”研究项目 李红 （北京师范大学） 集体合影
	主旨报告 1 & 2 主持人：郑宇健 （深圳大学）
9:00-9:45	Robert Brandom （匹兹堡大学） 规范性与自由
9:45-10:30	江怡 （山西大学） 皮尔士与规范性科学
	茶歇
	主旨报告3 & 4 主持人: Michael Beaney毕明安 （清华大学）
10:40-11:25	Hannah Ginsborg （加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校） 无理由的规范性
11:25-12:10	Stephen Finlay （南加利福尼亚大学） 超越规范性：元伦理学可以摆脱轮回吗？
	午餐（兰蕙餐厅）
	分会场B （京师学堂第二报告厅）		分会场C （京师学堂第五报告厅）
	主持人：周柏乔 （香港伍伦贡学院）		主持人：梅剑华 （山西大学）
13:40-14:05	郑宇健 （深圳大学）	模因，心灵与规范性	祖旭华 （台湾中正大学）	理性，内嵌性与伦理学中的想象案例
14:05-14:30	Ryan Simonelli （武汉大学）	语义规范性及其本体论对应物	郭峻赫 花晓雅 （中山大学，珠海）	关系性非支配调节下的民主公民性：对玛莎·努斯鲍姆“建设性羞耻”的批判
14:30-14:55	代海强 （北京师范大学）	原初规范性与遵守规则	Jérôme Pelletier （法国尼柯研究院）	虚构性判断的规范性
14:55-15:20	南星 （北京大学）	康德与规范性问题	卢俊豪 （中山大学）	道德的规范力量与美德理由
15:20-15:45	王彬彬 （北京物资学院）	麦克道威尔论德国观念论与维特根斯坦哲学中的规范性	钟世文 （华中科技大学）	无过程的建构主义：休谟式元伦理建构主义的两难问题
	茶歇
	主持人: 张浩军 （中国人民大学）		主持人: Sebastian Sunday Grève （北京大学）
16:00-16:25	周柏乔 （香港伍伦贡学院）	偶然、必然与类别的同一性	成素梅 （上海社会科学院）	规则的规范性与可变性
16:25-16:50	James Collin （越南VIN大学）	对“意义-资格”联结的再考察	高洁 （浙江大学）	探究活动与实践理性
16:50-17:15	赵新侃 （北京大学）	规范性反驳与着色策略	宋子明 （四川大学）	经典决策理论的规范性解读难题及其回应
17:15-17:40	林立霄 （清华大学）	审美断言与理解的规范	Davide Fassio （浙江大学）	论对客观主义的最佳反驳如何更有力地支持了客观主义
17:40-18:00	周红宇 （黑龙江大学）	语义规范性的跨时间解释及其问题	展翼文 （北京师范大学）	存在针对有限理性主体的知识规范吗？
	晚餐（兰蕙餐厅）

2024年11月3日
	分会场B （京师学堂第二报告厅）		分会场C （京师学堂第五报告厅）
	主持人：成素梅 （上海社会科学院）		主持人：Ivan Ivanov （首都师范大学）
8:30-8:55	张学广 （西北大学）	马克思与维特根斯坦论实践规范性	王华平 （中山大学，珠海）	契合性的表征理论
8:55-9:20	Ina Goy （北京师范大学）	康德是神圣设计论的支持者吗？	谢朗 （波恩大学） Nastasia Mueller （杜塞尔多夫大学）	论基础及高阶情感的客观性与规范性
9:20-9:45	刘科 （上海理工大学）	当代美德伦理“可法典化批判”的得失之间	Brandon Yip （新加坡管理大学）	道德与契合情感的价值
9:45-10:10	王帅 （深圳大学）	事实与原则：罗尔斯与柯恩正义理论中的辩护与第三人论证	周黄正蜜 （北京师范大学）	情感与无法则的合法则性
10:10-10:35	李卓群 （中国科学院大学）	精致后果主义能挽救认识后果主义吗？	谈知辰 （北京大学）	论模态安全性并不蕴含演化拆穿论证的失败
	茶歇
	主持人：展翼文 （北京师范大学）		主持人：牛婷婷 （上海社会科学院）
10:50-11:15	胡浩 （深圳大学）	论贝叶斯框架下对目的论与规范性意义的自然化	徐竹 （华东师范大学）	轴枢知识论中的非证据性理由
11:15-11:40	田海滨 （厦门大学）	无知、知识与探究规范	Kevin Lynch （华侨大学）	形式模式与质料模式
11:40-12:05	Fabio Ceravolo	合理的工具造作:论形而上学“工具箱”观的宽容性	张洪涛 （山东艺术学院）	论塞拉斯科学实在论的规范性特征
12:05-12:30	许嘉敏 范杰 （中国科学院大学）	浅析无知的本质：一种新规范观点	陈以森 （四川大学）	机器学习与先验知识
	午餐（兰蕙餐厅）
	分会场A（京师学堂京师厅）
	主旨报告 5 & 6 主持人：唐浩 （清华大学）
14:00-14:45	John Hyman （伦敦大学学院） 脆弱与辩解
14:45-15:30	唐热风 （北京师范大学） 反驳实践推理的“手段-目的”观
	茶歇
	主旨报告7 – 9 主持人：代海强 （北京师范大学）
15:40-16:25	Herman Cappelen （香港大学） 规范性语言的概念工程：改良抑或抛弃？
16:25-17:10	朱志方 （武汉大学） 价值陈述的经验辩护
17:10-17:55	Adrian Moore （牛津大学） 作为理性能动者的你我究竟在生活中扮演了什么角色？
17:55-18:00	闭幕致辞 李红 （北京师范大学）
	晚餐

PARTICIPANTS

参 会 嘉 宾

Anton Alexanderov (Peking University)

安东·亚历山大洛夫（北京大学）

Michael Beaney (Tsinghua University)

毕明安（清华大学）

Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)

罗伯特·布兰顿（匹兹堡大学）

Herman Cappelen (The University of Hong Kong)

赫尔曼·卡佩伦（香港大学）

Fabio Ceravolo (Formerly Leeds)

法比奥·塞拉沃洛（利兹大学博士）

I-Sen Chen (Sichuan University)

陈以森（四川大学）

Kang Chen (Anhui University of Finance and Economics)

陈康（安徽财经大学）

Sumei Cheng (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)

成素梅（上海社会科学院）

Pak Kiu Chow (UOW College HK)

周柏乔（香港伍伦贡学院）

James Collin (VinUniversity)

詹姆斯·科林（越南VIN大学）

Haiqiang Dai (Beijing Normal University)

代海强（北京师范大学）

Jie Fan (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

范杰（中国科学院大学）

Davide Fassio (Zhejiang University)

大卫·法西奥（浙江大学）

Duoyi Fei (China University of Political Science and Law)

费多益（中国政法大学）

Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California)

斯蒂芬·芬利（南加利福尼亚大学）

Jie Gao (Zhejiang University)

高洁（浙江大学）

Hannah Ginsborg (University of California, Berkeley)

汉娜·金斯伯格（加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校）

Ina Goy (Beijing Normal University)

伊娜·戈伊（北京师范大学）

Hao Hu (Shenzhen University)

胡浩（深圳大学）

Xiaoya Hua (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)

花晓雅（中山大学，珠海）

Weitao Huang (Central South University)

黄伟韬（中南大学）

John Hyman (University College London)

约翰·海曼（伦敦大学学院）

Ivan Ivanov (Capital Normal University)

伊万·伊万诺夫（首都师范大学）

Yi Jiang (Shanxi University)

江怡（山西大学）

Jun-Hyeok Kwak (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)

郭峻赫（中山大学，珠海）

Hong Li (Beijing Normal University)

李红（北京师范大学）

Jian Li (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

李剑（中国社会科学院）

Qilin Li (Peking University)

李麒麟（北京大学）

Zhuoqun Li (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

李卓群（中国科学院大学）

Lixiao Lin (Tsinghua University)

林立霄（清华大学）

Ke Liu (University of Shanghai for Science and Technology)

刘科（上海理工大学）

Junhao Lu (Sun Yat-sen University)

卢俊豪（中山大学）

Kevin Lynch (Huaqiao University)

凯文·林奇（华侨大学）

Jianhua Mei (Shanxi University)

梅剑华（山西大学）

Adrian Moore (University of Oxford)

阿德里安·摩尔（牛津大学）

Nastasia Mueller (University of Duesseldorf)

纳斯塔西娅·穆勒（杜塞尔多夫大学）

Xing Nan (Peking University)

南星（北京大学）

Tingting Niu (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)

牛婷婷（上海社会科学院）

Yue Pan (Beijing Normal University)

潘越（北京师范大学）

Jérôme Pelletier (Institut Nicod)

杰罗姆·佩尔蒂埃（法国尼柯研究院）

Xiaochen Qi (Hebei University)

齐晓晨（河北大学）

Ryan Simonelli (Wuhan University)

瑞安·西蒙内利（武汉大学）

Ziming Song (Sichuan University)

宋子明（四川大学）

Sebastian Sunday Grève (Peking University)

王小塞（北京大学）

Zhichen Tan (Peking University)

谈知辰（北京大学）

Hao Tang (Tsinghua University)

唐浩（清华大学）

Refeng Tang (Beijing Normal University)

唐热风（北京师范大学）

Haibin Tian (Xiamen University)

田海滨 （厦门大学）

Long Tse (University of Bonn)

谢朗（波恩大学）

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (Taiwan Chung Cheng University)

祖旭华（台湾中正大学）

Binbin Wang (Beijing Wuzi University)

王彬彬（北京物资学院）

Huaping Wang (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)

王华平（中山大学，珠海）

Shuai Wang (Shenzhen University)

王帅（深圳大学）

Xiangdong Wu (Beijing Normal University)

吴向东（北京师范大学）

Jiamin Xu (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

许嘉敏（中国科学院大学）

Zhu Xu (East China Normal University)

徐竹（华东师范大学）

Brandon Yip (Singapore Management University)

叶镇源（新加坡管理大学）

Yiwen Zhan (Beijing Normal University)

展翼文（北京师范大学）

Haojun Zhang (Renmin University of China)

张浩军（中国人民大学）

Hongtao Zhang (Shandong University of Arts)

张洪涛（山东艺术学院）

Xueguang Zhang (Northwest University)

张学广（西北大学）

Xinkan Zhao (Peking University)

赵新侃（北京大学）

Xudong Zheng (Beijing Normal University)

郑旭东（北京师范大学）

Yujian Zheng (Shenzhen University)

郑宇健（深圳大学）

Shiwen Zhong (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

钟世文（华中科技大学）

Hongyu Zhou (Heilongjiang University)

周红宇（黑龙江大学）

Jianzhang Zhou (Xiamen University)

周建漳（黑龙江大学）

Zhengmi Zhouhuang (Beijing Normal University)

周黄正蜜（北京师范大学）

Zhifang Zhu (Wuhan University)

朱志方（武汉大学）

Wenqi Zong (North University of China)

宗文奇（中北大学）

Abstracts

Fabio Ceravolo (Formerly Leeds)

法比奥·塞拉沃洛（利兹大学博士）

Abstract: The ‘toolbox’ (TB) view of metaphysics (French and McKenzie 2012; 2015) tates, in broad brush strokes, that theories, principles, and concepts developed in analytic metaphysics provide resources to help other disciplines build new theories, and that the opportunity to support theory construction in other disciplines ‘justifies’ doing work in analytic metaphysics as it is usually done, even when it fails to provide accurate or credible descriptions of reality. But it’s not as if metaphysics that falls short of providing these descriptions is always justified by the fact that it may provide serviceable tools for other disciplines. Whether it is justified turns on features of the context in which metaphysicians conduct their investigations. My goal is to explain what normative principles underlie this modesty. Taking clues from work in the philosophy of action, I will argue that, if we think with TB that metaphysical investigations may supply resources for other disciplines, then the most fitting view explaining why conducting these investigations is justified is that investigating is an action investigators have latitude to choose. To have latitude to act a certain way is, following Raz (1998, 1999), to have reasons for- and not to be unreasonable in avoiding the action. So, conducting defective metaphysical investigations, that fail to provide accurate or credible descriptions of reality, is normatively justified because metaphysicians have reasons to conduct the investigations, and are not unreasonable in avoiding them. TB’s trademark modesty according to which metaphysical investigations are justified only in certain contexts of investigation, naturally falls out of this view. But the view also provides a clearer assessment of the contexts in which conducting metaphysical investigations is not safe. These will be contexts in which there are no reasons for investigating.

I-Sen Chen (Sichuan University)

陈以森（四川大学）

Abstract: In this paper, I will argue that we can have justification for a priori (non-basic) knowledge that Peano’s axioms are consistent by enumerative induction. Inspired by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, my approach incorporates convergentist learning theory and the defeasibility theory. I first present my main argument which roughly consists of two major principles: (a) that if a learning method satisfies the norms of convergentism, then it is justified, and (b) that if a learning method is justified, then the belief it produces is prima facie justified. Next, I borrow convergentists’ argument to argue for (a). Then I use Pollock’s defeasibility theory and appeal to his doctrines of prima facie justification and of defeaters to defend (b). After that, I argue that we can have inductive justification for a priori knowledge on the basis of (a) and (b). I finally address a possible worry that my approach is too revisionary by making a comparison with the indispensability approach, and argue that it is not as objectionable as the latter. If my argument is correct, it starts up a promising approach to the problem of a priori knowledge.

Sumei Cheng (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)

成素梅（上海社会科学院）

Abstract: Rules are inextricably linked to skill acquisition. Although rules are the foundational premise of skill inheritance, the normativity of rules is not fixed. As learners get their expertise or skillful coping in the process of acquiring skills, they have not only developed muscular and neural memory, but also generated new insights and had a ability of providing more rational rules. The normativity and variability of rules expand the philosophical horizon from the theory of knowledge to the theory of skills, and from theoretical understanding to practical understanding.

Contingent, Necessary, and Sortal Identity

Pak Kiu Chow (UOW College HK)

周柏乔（香港伍伦贡学院）

Abstract: In this paper, I will argue that the identity of what is named by a natural-kind term can be understood as a case of sortal identity, rather than as a case of necessary identity associated with rigid designators. This claim is based on a review of Kripke’s thesis of necessary identity, Brandom’s analysis of sortals, and Gongsun’s inquiry into the criteria of identity for sortals.

James Collin (VinUniversity)

詹姆斯·科林（越南VIN大学）

Abstract: What is the relationship between epistemic and semantic normativity? One proposed point of contact is a meaning-entitlement connection (MEC) according to which speakers are automatically epistemically entitled to follow the norms or rules of their language. A MEC offers the tantalising possibility of both explaining apparently mysterious fundamental epistemic norms in terms of semantic norms and, thereby, underwriting entitlement to those norms. In doing so, it holds out the further promise of transforming and demystifying our understanding of a priority. Despite its promise, a MEC has not commended itself to many. However, recent significant work by Warren has done much to revive interest in a particularly strong version of the MEC. In this paper, I argue that Warren's arguments do not establish a MEC. However, I then present a novel argument for a modest MEC, from minimal inferentialist premises. I argue, further, that, notwithstanding its modesty, modest MEC can perform the same explanatory work as unrestricted MECs.

Primitive Normativity and Rule-Following

Haiqiang Dai(Beijing Normal University)

代海强（北京师范大学）

Abstract: In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private language, Saul Kripke established a rule-skepticism, according to which any strategy to respond to it needs to provide facts determining that the subject is following the rule, say, of addition, rather than that of quaddition. In this paper, I intend to propose a new kind of primitive normativity strategy to address the rule-skepticism. Firstly, I will reconstruct the skeptical argument, pointing out that the core issue is to solve the problem of rule-deviation. Then, an account of primitive normativity is proposed, based on an analysis of what counts as “seeming right” and what counts as “seeming wrong”, which answers the problem of rule-deviation. Finally, I will show that the primitive normativity and the public normativity are intrinsically interrelated, which can provide the source and foundation for the general considerations of normativity. This strategy relies on the regularity and primitive-normative attitude constructed by the subject in training, and it can satisfy both the factual and the normative conditions as required by the rule-skepticism.

Jie Fan & Jiamin Xu (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

范杰 & 许嘉敏（中国科学院大学）

Abstract: Ignorance is a significant philosophical concept, yet it has long been neglected. The discussions on ignorance can be traced back to the ancient Greece philosopher Socrates. From the famous inscription at the Temple of Delphi, “Know Thyself”, to Socrates’ claim, “The only thing I know is that I know nothing”, the concept of ignorance began to emerge in philosophical discourse. So far, ignorance has played a crucial role in various fields including epistemology, ethics, legal philosophy, social philosophy, philosophy of technology, and even science.

For a long time, the word “ignorance” has been understood as the complement of knowledge—simply put, ignorance means “not knowing”. This implies that theories of ignorance can be reduced to theories of knowledge, and the study of ignorance can be derived from the study of knowledge. This perspective is regarded as “The Standard View of Ignorance”, and the main supporter is Pierre Le Morvan. In 2010, Rik Peels who is the first one challenged this view, proposed an alternative explanation of the nature of ignorance, which called “The New View of Ignorance”, to avoid the problems faced by The Standard View. According to The New View, ignorance is lack of true belief. Since then, these two views have sparked a lasting debate in the philosophical community. Duncan Pritchard critiqued both views and introduced a normative condition in his “Normative Account”. Although Pritchard’s view avoids some difficulties faced by The Standard View and The New View, it presents its own set of issues (for example, it still cannot explain why ignorance has positive value sometimes). Additionally, the literatures also include other views such as the Access View. Until now, what is ignorance, or the nature of ignorance has been widely discussed in epistemology, yet no unified conclusion has been reached.

However, all these views agree on one point: if someone knows p, he is not ignorant of p. In other words, if one is ignorant of p, then one doesn’t know p. And all types of ignorance share a common feature: not knowing p. So “not knowing p” can be considered as a necessary condition for “being ignorant of p”. Furthermore, Pritchard noted that ignorance involves “ignorance is ought to be aware of but fails to be aware of”. It is vague and incomplete, but it offers a valuable inspiration. Based on this, our paper proposes a new definition of ignorance called “The New Normative View of Ignorance”, which holds that ignorance is not knowing what one should know, or not knowing what one should not know. In this context, “should know” refers to being able to know which means that there are ways to know, and failure to know would lead to bad result. “Should not know”, on the other hand, implies being able to know, but knowing will result in negative consequences, and thus one is not permitted to know.

The new normative view of ignorance retains Pritchard’s normative framework while providing a clearer explanation. Meanwhile, it provides new answers to the issues debated by The Standard View and The New View. From this new normative view, we can draw several conclusions:

(1) If someone doesn’t know unimportant propositions, it’s not ignorance;

(2) Not knowing propositions that are unknowable or cannot be known is not ignorance;

(3) Whether having true beliefs that are not knowledge counts as ignorance depends on the situation;

(4) Ignorance cannot always serve as an excuse, and when one should know but does not, ignorance cannot be an excuse, but when one ought not to know, ignorance can be an excuse;

(5) Whether a luckily true belief (such as Gettier-style cases) is a case of ignorance depends on whether one ought to know or not;

(6) One cannot be ignorant of false propositions, and holding a false belief does not constitute ignorance;

(7) Ignorance has both negative and positive values.

Davide Fassio (Zhejiang University)

大卫·法西奥（浙江大学）

Abstract: Objectivism is the view that how an agent ought to act depends on all kinds of facts, regardless of the agent’s epistemic position with respect to them (Thomson 1990; Graham 2010; [Author]). One of the most important challenges to this view is constituted by certain cases involving specific conditions of uncertainty – so-called three-options cases (examples are Jackson (1991)’s Doctor and Parfit (2011: 159-60)’s Miners cases). In these cases, it seems overwhelmingly plausible that an agent ought to do what is recommendable given her limited perspective, even though the agent knows that this is not objectively the best course of action.

In a recent article ([Author]), I defend a moderate version of objectivism according to which facts about the agent’s limited evidence can affect objective features of the situation such as the degrees of danger and recklessness, which in turn contribute to determine what an agent ought to do. This view avoids the challenge posed by three option cases. The proposal admits that in three-options cases the agent ought to do what is recommendable given her perspective, but maintains that this diagnosis of the cases is fully compatible with objectivism.

In this paper, I go a step further. I argue that moderate objectivism is the only plausible view that can avoid variants of three-option cases. I show that any other plausible view is affected by variants of the problem, including most forms of perspectivism (see also Littlejohn 2009; Smith 2011; Mason 2013). Only two views can avoid the problem: moderate objectivism and radical subjectivism. However, the latter view is implausible for independent reasons (e.g., Mason 2013: 10; Zimmerman 2008: 11-12). If my argument is sound, what many considers the main problem for objectivism turns out to be one of its main advantages.

References

Graham, P. A. (2010). In defense of objectivism about moral obligation. Ethics, 121(1), 88-115.

Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3), 461–482.

Kiesewetter, B. (2017). The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford University Press.

Littlejohn, C. (2009). Living With Uncertainty. Philosophical Books, 50(4): 235-247.

Mason, E. (2013). Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7(2): 1-21.

Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. Oxford University Press.

Smith, H. M. (2011). The Prospective View of Obligation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

Thomson, J. J. (1990). The realm of rights. Harvard University Press.

Zimmerman, M. J. (2008). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press.

Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California)

斯蒂芬·芬利（南加利福尼亚大学）

Abstract: What is the future of normativity? What should that future be? I employ the analogy of Samsara’s Wheel to characterize recent inquiry under the rubric ‘normativity’ as merely the latest epicycle in a futile circle of metaethical debate in which the same moves are reprised for different terms such as ‘ought’, ‘value’, ‘reasons’, ‘justification’, ‘authority’, ‘matters’, ‘fit’, etcetera. This futility is blamed on a four-way ambiguity running systematically throughout normative language. A two-dimensional, “perspectivist” diagnosis is provided of the difference between special (“robust”) and mundane (“merely formal”) normativity. By distinguishing between descriptive content and motivated perspective, the three major metaethical camps (noncognitivism, subjectivism, objectivism) are explained as corresponding to the three possible ways of flattening two dimensions into one, depending on whose perspective (judge, subject, or theorist) is privileged. This reveals the errors characteristic to each camp, and fragments “normativity” into multiple objects, denying the univocity of metaethical debate. Four obstacles to metaethical enlightenment are identified: illusion, attachment, charity, and forgetfulness.

Jie Gao (Zhejiang University)

高洁（浙江大学）

Abstract: Inquiry is a special type of activity that has both epistemological relevance and can serve practical purposes. The aim of this paper is to connect these two facets of inquiry and to argue for the following thesis: the mental attitude one needs to have towards p in order to appropriately relying on p as a premise in practical reasoning is partly determined by the proper goals of one’s inquiry. These goals are variable depending on factors such as individual intentions and social conventions.

My argument for the above thesis is based on two claims. One concerns action-related inquiry: in many cases, the goal of inquiry is to form a certain mental attitude about p in order to appropriately rely on p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning. The other is about aims of inquiry. In contrast to monist views on the aim of inquiry, I defend a pluralist view. According to this view, the aim of inquiry into a question Q is to improve one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q, where the epistemic standing can be both doxastic and non-doxastic. This view differs from other existing pluralist views insofar as it extends aims of inquiry to include non-doxastic attitudes, such as acceptance. This extension is supported by paradigmatic cases of scientific inquiry where the significance test is used as a standard for hypothesis acceptance. The implications of this argument will be further explored.

Ina Goy (Beijing Normal University)

伊娜·戈伊（北京师范大学）

Abstract: While traditionalist interpreters, such as Schmucker and Waschkies, defend the presence of divine design in Kant’s philosophy of biology, in her early work on Kant, Ginsborg denies any divine design of nature in Kant, arguing in a modernist fashion that the purposive form of organisms is caused by what she calls “primitive normativity”, a natural power. In this paper, I will reconsile Ginsborg’s modernist reading with the traditionalist readings of Schmucker and Waschkies. I will demonstrate that throughout his career, Kant is eager to find and validify an argument from divine design. In his early Theory of the Heavens (1755), Kant recognizes marks of divine design in the unity of the major mechanical orders of the macrocosmos. In the Ground of Proof essay (1763), marks of divine design appear in the unity of the highly complex minor mechanisms in the microcosmos also, in what Kant later calls‘organized’ beings. More destructive is Kant’s account of divine design in the first Critique(1781/7), and he completely avoids the notion of divine design in the second Critique (1788). In the third Critique (1790), however, Kant reintroduces a new variant of the design argument. Kant now claims that marks of devine design occur in the teleological laws of nature and in nature’s formative power. Kant now no longer grounds the design argument on a posteriori, empirical premises (the mechanical macrocosmic or microcosmic orders of nature) but on a priori premises instead (the teleological order of nature). In my view, Ginsborg’s primitive normativity reading can be safed if it is used as an interpetation of Kant’s formative power, but a formative power which is part of an account of the teleological causation of organic nature that, as traditional interpreters have shown (and I agree, but only regulatively), is ultimately created.

Hao Hu (Shenzhen University)

胡浩（深圳大学）

Abstract: The Canadian philosopher of Biology Denis Walsh claims that "when we offer a teleological explanation, we describe the way that the mechanism or cause in question conduces to the goal". (In the following, we will refer to it as 'the thesis of the naturalization of teleology' (TNT)). TNT results from the research consequences of Evo-Devo which use developmental plasticity to explain the adaptive evolution. Although TNT transforms the normative statement such as 'the purpose or the goal of breath requires the occurrences of gills' into a factual statement such as ’gills conduce to the breath.' It is not a thesis of reductionism. Here, 'conduce to' indicates a goal, and its meaning differs from 'cause', which is used in the causal-mechanistic explanation. Firstly, this paper tries to search for logical justifications for TNT by using basic probabilistic functions to formalize the relations between the Goals and Acts, such as using P(Acts/Goals) to characterize the normative role (degree) of the Goals which plays on the acts. It is natural to see the formalized version of TNT as the following formula:

" P(Acts/Goals)/P(Acts)= P(Goals/Acts)/P(Goals)".

This formula shows the equivalence between TNT and the Bayes theorem. So from the purely formal point of view, TNT is very strongly justified (despite the asymmetry of explanation). The formalized version of TNT also shows that every normative statement could be transformed into a descriptive statement. Especially, it naturalizes the normativity but does not reduce it to other things. Illuminated by TNT, we generate the thesis of the naturalization of " Meaning is normative": the normative role that the sentence meaning plays on its words can be transformed into the role which the words conduce to the sentence meaning(NMN). Thus, we could formalize NMN according to the Bayes theorem again.After the Formalization of NMN, it shows that the composition principle of meaning and the context principle are two sides of the same coin.

Yi Jiang (Shanxi University)

江怡（山西大学）

Abstract: Charles S. Peirce is the pioneer of American pragmatism and the proponent of normative sciences. We are familiar with his first title but not the second. For Peirce, normative sciences include logic, ethics, and aesthetics, all concerned with criteria for the human mind. However, Peirce concentrated on normativity as a norm for inquiring in logic. In all the normative sciences, Peirce highlighted normativity as the first to the criteria of human self-control, which makes him a philosopher of normativity in a logical sense. In this presentation, I will argue that Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is keen to his notation of normativity by a certification of judging the meaning of words corresponding to their conceived effects. By the notation of normativity, Peirce inferred from the psychological interpretation of words to the semiotic explanation of actions.

Democratic Civility with Relational Non-domination: A Critique of Martha Nussbaum’s “Constructive Shame.”

Jun-Hyeok Kwak & Xiaoya Hua (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)

郭峻赫&花晓雅（中山大学，珠海）

Abstract: Recently, scholars have paid much attention to the role of political emotion in rectifying dysfunctional and asymmetric relationships between citizens, particularly the resentment of those who feel loss of respect due to actual experiences of sociopolitical domination. Concomitantly, they are also interested in a set of emotions that function to insulate individuals from their relationships with others. Among these negative emotions, shame has been taken, particularly by Kantian liberal theorists, as one of the most pernicious emotions that are correlated with violations of individual autonomy and human dignity. They also view that shame functions to keep us living up to moral standards we currently endorse. However, it must be emphasized that they are skeptical of any criticism that tries to find the causes of the crisis of liberal democracy mainly in the decline of “civility.” In this light, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of political emotion has been exalted as the most plausible supplementation for the ethics of liberal individualism. She has promoted an emotional mechanism of sympathy through which liberal societies render toleration and mutual respect more practicable and stable. In particular, she suggests an appropriate way of cultivating political emotions conducive to liberal civility without losing the characteristics of liberalism. But Nussbaum’s revision still raises a number of worries. All of these worries call into question the guidelines for public inquiry into positive political emotion. Based on these observations, first, finding fault with Martha Nussbaum’s theory of constructive shame, this paper shows the need for a regulative principle beyond tracking psychological origins, with which the role of political emotions in shaping democratic civility can be rendered reliably salutary. Then, this paper suggests “relational non-domination” as the more plausible regulative principle with which political emotion can be steered to promote democratic deliberation.

Zhuoqun Li (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

李卓群（中国科学院大学）

Abstract: According to epistemic consequentialism, the normative force of epistemic norms derives from the epistemic value of the epistemic consequences. As an important objection, the trade-off objection states that, contrary to the assertion of epistemic consequentialism, certain beliefs maximize epistemic value but aren't justified. Inspired by consequentialism in the field of ethics, Driver &Singer developed their sophisticated epistemic consequentialism(SEC) in the field of epistemology. They distinguish between epistemic right, whose criteria is independent of the internal characteristics of the subject, and epistemic responsibility, whose criteria is dependent on the internal characteristics of the subject. They position SEC as a theory about epistemic rightness, which does not explain responsibility. On the basis of these claims, They insist that SEC can avoid the trade-off objection, because the belief in trade-off counter-example is subjectively blameworthy and objectively right. However, Driver and Singer both presuppose a symmetry in the conceptual structure of moral evaluation and epistemic evaluation, the assumption troubles SEC in two ways. On the one hand, with its adherence to objective consequentialist, its distinction between rightness and responsibility ignores the significance of the integrity of subjecthood for cognitive evaluation. On the other hand, its evaluating cognitive dispositions separately from beliefs makes it encounter not only the difficulties of consequentialism in ethics, but also makes it encounter the difficulties that SEC only encounters in epistemology:The cultivation of moral decision-making procedures in ethics can be based on correct beliefs, but the identity of epistemic tendencies as source of beliefs leads to more trouble. I’ll argue that the SEC cannot avoid two objections: the integrity objection and the normative objection. The first one is the integrity objection .It’s possible to construct a epistemological version of the integrity objection, just like Williams did in the moral philosophy .The objective norms endorsed by the SEC cannot be pursued by the subject in an internally coherent manner, after the subject has realized a belief is both unjustified and extremely conducive to epistemic good. It implicitly entails self-contradictory imperative. So SEC entails that we have to abandon our commitment to the engaging in our epistemic reasons, when we are in some special situation. SEC’s requirement is incompatible with the integrity. Integrity is a necessary condition for epistemic subjecthood, and so thus this requirement is absurd. The second objection is the normative objection. Because the SEC treats the rightness as a normative criterion for fostering epistemic dispositions, this paper develops a normative objection, which emphasizes SEC’s over-demanding on agent in the actual world. The objection argues that the SEC cannot provide any norm for us to correctly regulate our activity of fostering epistemic dispositions. There are two reasons. On the one hand, sophisticated consequentialism's requirement is beyond the scope of the subject's foreseeability, and unrealistic requirements that are beyond the scope of the subject's competence have no normative validity, if ought implies can; on the other hand, the SEC's reliance on empirical beliefs to validate epistemic dispositions ignores the fact that the epistemic dispositions are both the object of scrutiny and the source of knowledge in the process. According to the SEC's criteria, the beliefs generated by this epistemic source may not be justified and right beliefs within the subject's perspective, and their status is mysterious. In short, sophisticated consequentialism cannot save epistemic consequentialism. The epistemic consequentialist will face a dilemma: either continue to face the threat of a trade-off objection or accept sophisticated epistemic consequentialism and face some new difficulties.

Lixiao Lin (Tsinghua University)

林立霄（清华大学）

Abstract: Aesthetic assertions – assertions involving aesthetic adjectives, such as “beautiful”, “ugly”, and “elegant” – normally come with an acquaintance inference: They often give rise to an inference to the effect that the speaker has had a certain kind of first-hand experience with the object of predication. For example, if I tell you “Spirited Away is beautiful”, you would normally assume that I have actually watched the film and am not relying on the testimony of others. This phenomenon has received significant attention in recent literature, and many accounts have been proposed (See, for example, Pearson, 2013, Ninan, 2014, Franzen, 2018, Willer and Kennedy, 2020, Zakkou, 2019, Ninan, 2023, Briesen, 2024).

In this talk, I argue in favour of a norm-based account for the acquaintance inference, according to which aesthetic assertions are governed by a special understanding norm. For example, my account claims that the sentence “Spirited Away is beautiful” is assertable, only if the speaker understands a constitutive reason why Spirited Away is beautiful. I argue that such an understanding requires relevant first-hand experience, and that’s why assertions involving aesthetic predicates often give rise to an acquaintance inference.

I will show how my account is superior to the existing accounts in the literature. Significantly, I will argue that my account is more robust than a branch of expressivist account proposed by some recent authors, such as Franzen (2018), Willer and Kennedy (2020), Ninan (2023), and Briesen (2024).

Ke Liu (University of Shanghai for Science and Technology)

刘科（上海理工大学）

Abstract: A central bone of contention between virtue ethics and rule ethics lies in their divergent stances on the issue of "codifiability." Rule ethics insists that moral conduct should be informed by a transparent set of decision procedure that delineate a decision-making framework. It asserts that virtue ethics, lacking such a structured approach, is marred by the flaw of "uncodifiability." Conversely, virtue ethics embrace this very characteristic, perceiving it not as a shortcoming but a strong point of their ethical system's adaptability and depth. Indeed, contemporary virtue ethics has its origins in a critique of mainstream rule-based ethics, and arguably one of the most important aspects of this critique is the critique of codifiability. As defined by Rosalind Hursthouse, a representative of contemporary virtue ethics, codifiability refers to the belief that the task of normative ethics is to provide a set of universal formula or principles (or even a single rule, in the case of behavioral utilitarianism) with the following two distinctive features: (1) they amount to a decision procedure for determining what is the right action to take in a particular situation; and (2) they are stated in such a way that they can be understood and correctly applied by those who lack virtue. Virtue ethics mounts a critique of codifiability across three dimensions: practical reasoning, rule application, and practical deliberation.These criticisms go a considerable way to point out some of the misconceptions of rule ethics. However, some virtue ethicists have overstepped by rejecting the functions of rule ethics in moral philosophy outright, a stance that may inadvertently misguide the discourse on codifiability. It is essential to appreciate the limitations and inherent necessity of moral rules, acknowledging that they should not be the sole arbiters of ethical conduct but rather serve as a complementary component within a broader ethical framework.

Junhao Lu (Sun Yat-sen University)

卢俊豪（中山大学）

Abstract: To secure the normative force of morality, many philosophers have constructed frameworks of moral cognitivism grounded in either realism or anti-realism, aiming for eternal and objective moral truths. However, these approaches often overlook the historical (vertical) and social (horizontal) dimensions of human moral sensitivity. They fail to account for the distinct ways individuals with virtues perceive the external world compared to those lacking such sensitivity. Consequently, only those marked by moral sensitivity can form appropriate grounds for action by responding to virtue reasons. Thus, the normative force of morality is assured exclusively through agents capable of such responses. This perspective allows for a dynamic and open-ended discourse on moral truths within the framework of moral cognitivism, emphasizing that these discussions are deeply rooted in virtues and moral sensitivity.

Kevin Lynch (Huaqiao University)

凯文·林奇（华侨大学）

Abstract: Though interest in Carnap’s philosophy has increased in recent years, his formal and material mode distinction has not attracted much attention. In this paper I will elucidate this important distinction, particularly with respect to the issue of philosophical definitions. Carnap’s position is contrasted with what I call the ‘traditionalist’ position that regards material and linguistic questions as different, whereas Carnap held that they are just different phrasings of the same questions. I will describe why Carnap believed the formal mode to be more correct or accurate, and will enumerate the various problems associated with the material mode of speech. Then I assess what I take to be the most common traditionalist reply to Carnap’s position, which invokes the real definition/nominal definition distinction. Finally, I argue that we should make a three-fold distinction between, the material, formal and conceptual modes of speech, rather than Carnap’s two-fold distinction. The issues discussed are of wide relevance in philosophy, relating to issues such as philosophical methodology and metaphilosophy, naturalism, definition, the linguistic turn, and normativity.

Adrian Moore (University of Oxford)

阿德里安·摩尔（牛津大学）

Abstract: The philosopher Robert Stern died at a tragically young age in August of this year. Shortly before he died, there was a conference to celebrate his work at which he was a lively participant despite his failing health. My essay is my own contribution to that conference. In his Presidential Address for the Aristotelian Society Stern exploited some of Iris Murdoch’s work to address an aporia connected to the idea of benevolent agency: benevolence seems to preclude choice about what to do, whereas agency seems to require it. Stern’s resolution of this aporia was to locate the agency in attending to the reasons for what to do rather than in choosing to do it. I argue that there are problems with this resolution, one of which is that it is couched in ‘realist’ terms. I present an anti-realist alternative that draws on Bernard Williams’ notion of a thick ethical concept. I explore similarities and dissimilarities between Stern’s resolution and this alternative, and I counter an objection to the alternative, namely that it simply begs a critical question. I conclude that, while the alternative is not enough to refute Stern’s position, it is a genuine alternative that deserves consideration.

Long Tse (University of Bonn)

谢朗（波恩大学）

Nastasia Mueller (University of Duesseldorf)

纳斯塔西娅·穆勒（杜塞尔多夫大学）

Abstract: Emotions play a crucial role in human experience. They provide causal explanations of behavior and shape our perceptions, decisions, and interactions with the world around us. Despite their significance, the ontological status of emotions—whether they exist as fundamental aspects of reality or as derivative constructs—remains a subject of debate in both philosophical and psychological discourse. This paper seeks to explore and clarify the varying ontological statuses of different emotions, positing that some emotions are more fundamental than others in the fabric of human experience. But not only are there more fundamental emotions, our knowledge of the concept of emotions plays a peculiar role. Society, culture, and cultural specific narrative practices shape and influence our concept of emotion.

Xing Nan (Peking University)

南星（北京大学）

Abstract: Although Kant (or any of his contemporaries) had never used the term ‘normativity’, it is often assumed that the problem of normativity was discovered or even invented by Kant. Kant was the first major modern philosopher to clearly distinguish logic from psychology, thus establishing the normative status of the former. By generalizing this distinction, he also gave a normative account of the nature of morals and taste, in opposition to Humean ‘universal empiricism’. However, Kant’s conception of normativity is extremely austere, and his explanation of the varieties of normativity seems to be based on a dubious metaphysical psychology. In this presentation, I shall first give an outline of Kant’s theory of normativity, and then raise some questions about its basic assumptions. Such an analysis will lead us not only to a better appreciation of the fundamental problem of Kant’s philosophy, but also to a deeper understanding of the real problem in the philosophical debates concerning normativity.

Jérôme Pelletier (Institut Nicod)

杰罗姆·佩尔蒂埃（法国尼柯研究院）

Abstract: I argue that “the fictional” is a metanorm inviting readers and spectators to give a merely formal character to the normative force of their mental states (cognitions, perceptions and emotions) and that a normative permissivism towards the norms of mental states constitute the fictionality of a work. I show first that ‘fictional’ in fictionality judgements like “x is fictional” sorts representations ‘subsectively’ by their fictionality in representing. According to the proposal, a fictional crowning is a fictional representation of a crowning, not a kind of crowning. Second, I argue that the main point of fictionality judgements is not to express beliefs or other cognitive states but to prescribe the endorsement of a general attitude of detachment from all the mental norms that constrain us outside fiction. I conclude by mentioning various benefits of the proposal and by contrasting it with other accounts.

Ryan Simonelli (Wuhan University)

瑞安·西蒙内利（武汉大学）

Abstract: According to “modal normativism,” modal sentences such as “If something’s round, then it can’t possibly be square” are to be understood as expressions of semantic norms. While some modal normativists take this position to involve a sort of anti-realism about modal facts, others argue that this position is to be paired with a robust form of realism about modal facts. If we do adopt the latter view, then there is an important question about the conditions under which semantic norms will come to correspond to objective modal facts. In this paper, I address this question, considering two importantly distinct vocabularies: scientific vocabulary and color vocabulary. Though both vocabularies are “fact-stating,” I argue, in the first case, we do have a genuine correspondence, whereas, in the second case, there is a systematic failure of correspondence. By making sense of both possibilities, the resulting view avoids both skepticism and idealism.

Ziming Song (Sichuan University)

宋子明（四川大学）

Abstract: One important problem in the philosophy of decision theory is how to understand classical decision theory at the normative level. Even as a formal tool, it has been regarded as conforming to certain basic principles of human rational choice since its inception, and has been used to explain and predict choice behavior. The mentalist interpretation of decision theory presupposes that the theoretical elements have corresponding psychological counterparts. Contemporary criticisms of the mentalist presupposition argue that it misconstrues the formal model of decision theory. Meanwhile, the normative dimension of decision theory is also challenged by empirical research such as behavioral economics. However, with further analysis of the problem of normatively characterizing decision theory, I defenda position that characterizes classical decision theory from a normative perspective, aiming to demonstrate that normative decision theory is a "logic" for evaluating the desirability of choices.

Zhichen Tan (Peking University)

谈知辰（北京大学）

Abstract: Modal Security suggests a necessary condition of undermining defeater: evidence undermines a belief only if this evidence shows that this belief is either unsafe or insensitive. It has been argued that Modal Security implies the failure of Evolutionary (moral) Debunking Arguments (EDAs). The purpose of this paper is to argue that Modal Security does not imply the failure of EDAs. I begin by showing that the Modal Response mistakenly claims that debunkers have to assume that our actual moral beliefs, e.g., killing an innocent person is morally wrong, are true. I then argue that, when our actual moral beliefs are not assumed to be true, only sensitivity-based Modal Security can still be used to discuss EDAs because safety-based Modal Security cannot handle the cases where the contents of our actual moral beliefs are neither true nor false. Finally, I show that sensitivity-based Modal Security does not imply the failure of EDAs.

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (Taiwan Chung Cheng University)

祖旭华（台湾中正大学）

Abstract: Suppose that rationality consists essentially in responding correctly to reasons, then it is of utmost importance to figure out how reasons behave, so that a correct response could be made. In Tsu (2018; forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly), he advocates a general constraint on how moral reasons behave, which he calls by the name of ‘embeddedness thesis’ (ET): for all x, if x is a moral reason, x must be embedded in the context in the sense that it cannot be abstracted away from its instantiated context and still retain its moral reason status in the abstract (x: features of actions). However, an objection to it is that in deliberative cases, x is not instantiated in any context, yet can still remain to be a moral reason for or against action. In this paper, I address this objection, drawing on the aid of imagination, and explore ET’s implications for imaginary cases in ethics.

Binbin Wang (Beijing Wuzi University)

王彬彬（北京物资学院）

Abstract: McDowell argues that the first sentence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus should not be seen as expressing a grand ontological or metaphysical horizon, but rather as an expression of some kind of idealism. By observing McDowell's description of the necessity of Wittgenstein's private language argument, it is possible to get a clearer picture of the relationship between Wittgenstein and German idealism. The line advocated by McDowell is that the opposition between nature and reason can be proven wrong once the normative space of reason is interpreted to conform to naturalisation rather than Platonism. McDowell's philosophy is based on a Kantian-Wittgenstein understanding of the concept of experience that it contains normative conceptual content. McDowell argues that Kant sought to construct an idealism that strikes a balance between subjectivity and objectivity. McDowell discusses the relationship between publicity and normativity. He argues that insisting on the authority of rational norms leads to the danger of falling into the pre-critical Platonism, and that the emphasis on publicness is a necessary corrective measure. However, Brandom's way of establishing norms places too much emphasis on publicity, and he wants to maintain a balance between rationality and publicity.

Huaping Wang (Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai)

王华平（中山大学，珠海）

Recent years have seen the rise of the “fittingness-first” account of normativity, which takes fittingness to be the fundamental feature of normativity, with the rest of the normative domain being accounted for in terms of fittingness. The fittingness-first account has the advantage of avoiding the problems that confront the “value-first” and “reasons-first” accounts, while providing a unified picture of the normative domain. Nevertheless, it faces a pressing problem regarding the nature of fittingness—namely, what does it mean for an attitude to be fitting? Given that the “fittingness-first” account is a metaphysical account of the property of fittingness, this problem is especially urgent. To address this issue, I will propose a representational theory. According to my proposal, for an attitude to be fitting is for it to involve a proper pushmi-pullyu representation (PPR). A PPR contains both a descriptive and a directive representation. A descriptive representation represents what is the case and is characterized by its truth conditions. A directive representation is one that guides our attitudes and actions and is characterized by its satisfaction conditions. A PPR is proper when its descriptive representation is accurate, and its directive representation is satisfied. With the concept of PPR clarified, I will then argue that my representational theory can resolve the notorious wrong kind of reasons problem as well as the partiality problem.

Shuai Wang (Shenzhen University)

王帅（深圳大学）

Abstract: In the realm of moral and political philosophy, the interplay between facts and principles has long sparked debate, particularly when constructing a robust theory of justice. One might wonder whether principles of justice are inherently insulated from the shifting sands of empirical reality or whether they must, to some degree, engage with the factual landscape they seek to regulate. This paper navigates this intricate terrain by examining two influential yet contrasting approaches: Rawls’s relational egalitarianism and Cohen’s luck egalitarianism. These perspectives not only differ in their conceptualization of justice but also in their underlying assumptions about the role of facts in justifying moral principles. By scrutinizing these approaches through the lens of third-person justification, this paper endeavors to explore the logical foundations and potential vulnerabilities of Cohen’s fact-insensitive principles, particularly in light of challenges akin to Parmenides’ “Third Man Argument.”

Zhu Xu (East China Normal University)

徐竹（华东师范大学）

Abstract: Recent work in hinge epistemology has increasingly highlighted the possibility of distinguishing evidential warrants from the concept of epistemic rationality. Ongoing debates focus on whether such a separation is feasible and, if so, how it might be achieved. Crispin Wright contends that hinge propositions indeed possess epistemic warrants, albeit in a non-evidential rather than evidential manner. In contrast, Annalisa Coliva holds that while hinge propositions may only receive pragmatic warrants and lack epistemic warrant altogether, they nevertheless play a constitutive role in epistemic rationality. In this paper, I advocate a position closer to Wright’s than to Coliva’s, yet one that diverges significantly from Wright’s reasoning. My approach to non-evidential reasons is grounded primarily in epistemology of testimony, a framework I argue can be effectively applied to hinge epistemology. This stance yields a novel perspective on Wittgenstein’s hinge-related assertion: “[my picture of the world] is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.”

Brandon Yip (Singapore Management University)

叶镇源（新加坡管理大学）

Abstract: How do we determine if an emotion is fitting? One standard way involves determining the correctness conditions of an emotion and then seeing if those conditions instantiated. The problem with this methodology is that it struggles to distinguish between formally normative and authoritatively normative standards of fitting emotion. In this paper, I argue that our reflection on the fittingness of emotion is incomplete if we do not consider the value of fitting emotion. Critically expanding on Rowland’s (2022) recent work, I suggest that we can explain which emotional standards are authoritatively normative by reflecting on the non-instrumental value of our emotions. An important and pervasive source of the non-instrumental value of emotion, I argue, consists in the constitutive role they play in participatory practices. My proposal also has significant upshot: it makes room for morality to determine authoritative standards of fittingness.

Yiwen Zhan(Beijing Normal University)

展翼文（北京师范大学）

Abstract: We are bounded agents not only in that we have limited knowledge and practical capabilities, but also in that we have limited resources. In this talk I aim to explore the epistemological implications of resource-boundedness. Standard epistemology typically treats an agent’s bounds in resource as a practical matter, and hence as irrelevant to the agent’s epistemic rationality. I argue that this is a fatal over-idealization. Any epistemic reason that fails to take into account the respective agent’s bounds in resource is not warranted to be a genuine epistemic norm. Based on this, I further contend that if there are any genuine epistemic norms, those norms must be zetetic norms, i.e., norms of inquiry. Epistemic rationality, thus construed, is a species of bounded rationality.

Hongtao Zhang (Shandong University of Arts)

张洪涛（山东艺术学院）

Abstract: We do not always commit ourselves to the existence of any entity in science, and bloated ontology is a mistake. For Sellars, theorys about observable things can explain observable things, however, scientific theorys follow the grammatical and logical order rather than the subsistent and causal order because of the practical relationship between the observational and theoretical frameworks.

Xueguang Zhang (Northwest University)

张学广（西北大学）

Abstract: For the problem of normativity, Marx and Wittgenstein have a similar linguistic turn. They all think that the normative contents or rules in our action and language are not something a priori and independent, but one connected closely with our practice. Marx establishes his view of normativity in the process against idealism of Hegelian and Young Hegelian philosophies. He takes a point that only departing from the people who engage in the practical activities and their actual environment can the true features of a society and history be revealed, and the normativity on which the people’s activities and language are depended be found out the real source. Just in terms of this point, Marx judges the capitalist society and orients the futural society. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s discussion in the normativity of using language is also based on his criticism to the traditional philosophy (metaphysics) which detaches the linguistic practice and generates the philosophical problems. He claims that only a rule which is treated against its practical activity can it be contextual certain, and such certainty relies on the agreement of techniques being trained and attained by all the social members. Of course, because their difference in the focus of research and attention, Marx’s and Wittgenstein’s viewpoint of practical normativity have both similarity and complementarity and discrepancy even conflict.

Xinkan Zhao (Peking University)

赵新侃（北京大学）

Abstract: The normativity objection challenges normative naturalism by arguing that we have a distinctive cognitive experience when making normative judgements, finding ourselves in touch with some action-guiding authority issuing demands from outside, and that this cannot be explained naturalistically. An increasing number of naturalists have defended their position by adopting the coloring strategy, which aims to explain away the need for positing a special property and contends that the normative feel results from the intricate work of our mind which colors the world. In this paper, I critically review the extant strategies and consider what the most plausible form of the strategy would look like. I further argue that even the strategy in its most plausible form faces serious problems, that it lacks positive motivation, that it is self-defeating, and that it may well be unnecessary in the first place. As a result, the coloring strategy as a response to the normativity objection should be rejected, though it may have merits in intramural debates among naturalists.

Yujian Zheng (Shenzhen University)

郑宇健（深圳大学）

Abstract: Prominent memeticists like Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore have made claims far more radical than those included in Dawkins’ original proposal, which provoked increasingly heated debates and arguments over the theoretical significance as well as limits or flaws of the entire memetic enterprise. In this paper, I examine closely some of the critical points taken by Kate Distin in her penetrating engagement with those radical claims, which include such ideas as the thought that we are meme machines as much as gene machines, the thesis that there is no conscious self inside those machines, and the claim that a complex interplay of replicators and environment is all there is to life (Blackmore 1999: 241). It is hoped that a viable thesis concerning a deep-seated normativity emerges from my discussion.

Shiwen Zhong (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

钟世文（华中科技大学）

Abstract: In order to provide a satisfactory account about normativity of practical reason, constructivists believe that we should understand the significance of the practical standpoint. Street proposes this is the distinctive feature of constructivism rather than procedures. In this paper I will argue that a successful constructivist account about practical reason relies on a certain understanding about the practical standpoint, which is the standpoint as agent per se. However, to construct the normative truth from this standpoint must appeal to the forms of laws. Otherwise, this account would either fall into a version of expressivism or fail to provide the required justification for agents. That is why the procedures still play a central role in a successful account of practical reason and agency.

Hongyu Zhou (Heilongjiang University)

周红宇（黑龙江大学）

Abstract: There are several different conceptions of Saul Kripke’s thesis that meaning is normative. The so-called transtemporal interpretation is one among them that especially highlights the transtemporal aspect of normativity. Collin McGinn is the first major philosopher who advocates this kind of interpretation. According to him, the semantic normativity amounts to a requirement that a speaker’s present use of a word should conform with its previous meaning with which he earlier used it. The most serious defect of McGinn’s understanding of the normativity of meaning is that it does not pose any substantial constraint on theories of meaning. As a latest supporter of the transtemporal reading, Hannah Ginsborg identifies the normativity relevant to meaning with the primitive normativity which is a condition of the possibility of meaning. However, it seems obvious that the normativity of meaning interpreted by Ginsborg is not the thesis that Kripke is operating with.

Zhengmi Zhouhuang (Beijing Normal University)

周黄正蜜（北京师范大学）

Abstract: In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant employs the term “lawfulness without law” to describe aesthetic normativity, distinguishing it from theoretical and practical normativity. I propose that this term can also be applied to nonmoral ethical normativity concerning happiness. Since this type of lawfulness is not predetermined, it emerges during the agents' activities and is defined through reflection on those activities. The indicator of this lawfulness is a feeling of pleasure, which arises when agents recognize that the activity itself serves as a purpose. In this sense, pleasure can be understood as the consciousness of the internal purposiveness of the agent's activity.

Zhifang Zhu (Wuhan University)

朱志方（武汉大学）

Abstract: Hume’s law, or the fact/value dichotomy is right in view of the syntax of normative/value statements and statements of the matter of fact, but wrong in consideration of the ways of their justification. Normative statements can be justified empirically or in the way of empirical method. Justifications of them by intuition or pure reason or transcendental method would make normative statements arbitrary or irrational.